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CASE NOTE ON JACOB V SAVE BEELIAR WETLANDS (INC):
MANDATORY RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS, ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURES AND LEGAL UNREASONABLENESS
PHILLIP PAUL*
ABSTRACT
Martin CJ’s judgment in Save Beeliar Wetlands v Jacob1 created a significant degree
of uncertainty for many state departments and statutory bodies. The primary
implication being that published policies were potentially mandatory relevant
considerations in their administrative decision making processes. It presaged the
urgent review of many such policies to avoid future challenges from similarly
disgruntled parties.

The Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia’s unanimous
decision in Jacob v Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc)2 has somewhat remedied that
uncertainty.

McLure P, in a judgment affirmed by both Buss and Newnes JJA, overturned Martin
CJ’s judgment. That judgment considered the Environmental Protection Authority’s
(EPA) recommendation for approval of the proposal to extend the Roe Highway
through the Beeliar Wetlands. It also considered the subsequent approval by the
Minister. The EPA was found to have fallen into jurisdictional error. The Chief
Justice held that the EPA had failed to take into account its own published policies

* Final year LLB student, University of Notre Dame Australia.
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when it recommended the approval. This failure rendered the recommendation and
the approval invalid, and amounted to a denial of procedural fairness.3

On appeal, McLure P identified three contentions that required determination.
Firstly, that the EPA was obligated to consider its own policies in making its
assessment and recommendation.4 Secondly, that it was legally unreasonable that it
had not, in fact, done so.5 Finally, that it had failed to properly question the
environmental acceptability of allowing the implementation of the project using
offsets, given the significance of the affected areas.6

The Court of Appeal determined that the EPA Policies were not ‘mandatory relevant
considerations’.7 Hence, the process by which the EPA had made its
recommendation was not legally unreasonable;8 the correct question had been asked
and answered.9 On that basis the Court allowed the appeal.10

I

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In April 2009 a proposal to extend the Roe Highway from the Kwinana Freeway to
Stock Road was submitted by the Commissioner for Main Roads Western Australia
to the EPA for assessment. The area within which much of the extension is situated
has been designated in the Metropolitan Region Scheme since 1963.

3

Save Beeliar Wetlands [2015] WASC 482 (16 December 2015) [181], [186].
Jacob (2016) 216 LGERA 201, 213 [62].
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The proposed path of the extension traverses several significant areas of wetland that
make up the Beeliar Regional Park, and includes Conservation Category Wetlands11.
The project is expected to result in the clearing of over 70 hectares of foraging
habitat of both the Carnaby’s and Red-tailed Black Cockatoos, and 2.5 hectares of
nesting habitat of the Black Cockatoo. It will also fragment the remaining habitat.
The role of the EPA in environmental assessments is defined in the Environmental
Protection Act 1986 (WA) (‘EPA Act’). Section 44 requires the EPA to provide a
report to the Minister for Environment (‘the Minister’) regarding its assessment
findings, upon receipt of which the Minister then makes the final decision regarding
approval of the proposal.
In February 2003 the EPA had published Bulletin 108812 in which it advised the then
Minister that, inter alia:
the EPA is of the opinion that the overall impacts of construction within the road reserve, or
any alignment through the Beeliar Regional Park in the vicinity of North Lake and Bibra
Lake, would lead to the ecological values of the area as a whole being diminished in the
long-term. Every effort should be made to avoid this.

In January 2006 the EPA published Position Statement No. 913 in which it defined
the comprehensive decision-making process to be followed when environmental
offsets are being considered. The statement enunciated a series of questions that were
to be addressed in evaluating what, if any, offsets were to be recommended.

11

‘CCWs [Conservation Category Wetlands] are high priority wetlands which support a high level of
environmental attributes and functions ...’ Jacob v Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc) (2016) 216 LGERA
201, 205 [11] (McLure P).
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Environmental Protection Authority of Western Australia, Bulletin 1088, Environmental values
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Offsets – Position Statement No. 9, January 2006.
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In September 2008 the EPA published Guidance Statement No. 1914 which addressed
the specific issue of biodiversity with respect to environmental offsets. Whilst
generally consistent with the earlier Position Statement No. 9, there was an exception
noted. A proposal with significant residual impact might nonetheless be allowed to
implement offsets if it was deemed not to be unacceptable.

In the same month the EPA published Environmental Protection Bulletin No 115
which also traversed the requirements of environmental offsets with respect to
biodiversity. Of particular significance, it stated that ‘the EPA adopts a presumption
against recommending approval of proposed projects where significant adverse
environmental impacts affect ‘critical’ assets.’16

The EPA Roe Highway Extension Assessment Report17 was delivered to the Minister
in September 2013. It concluded that the project could be delivered in such a manner
as to meet the EPA’s required environmental objectives with the implementation of a
number of conditions,18 one of which was the establishment of appropriate offsets for
‘the significant residual impacts to fauna, vegetation and wetlands (Condition 12).’19
Importantly, in Condition 12 the EPA recommended that the power to determine the
necessary requirements for a Land Acquisition and Management Plan (LAMP) and
its timing, be delegated to the CEO. The minimum parameters for the LAMP were

14

Environmental Protection Authority of Western Australia, Guidance Statement, Guidance for the
Assessment of Environmental Factors – Environmental Offsets – Biodiversity No. 19, September
2008.
15
Environmental Protection Authority of Western Australia, Bulletin No 1, Environmental Offsets,
September 2008.
16
Ibid 2.
17
Environmental Protection Authority of Western Australia, Assessment Report, Report and
recommendations of the Environmental Protection Authority – Roe Highway Extension – Report
1489, 3 September 2013 (‘Assessment Report’).
18
Ibid vi.
19
Ibid viii.
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specified so as to at least address the losses expected to arise from the extension
works.

A total of 165 appeals were lodged against the Assessment Report which included
appeals from each of the applicants in Save Beeliar Wetlands. The Minister
ultimately determined those appeals, made some amendments to the proposed
conditions and published his final approval on 2 July 2015.

II THE PRIMARY CHALLENGE: SAVE BEELIAR WETLANDS (INC) V JACOB
The applicants in the primary case were Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc), an incorporated
association, and Carole de Barre. Ms de Barre was a local resident whose interests
were conceded by the respondents to be directly affected by the decision under
review, and therefore her standing was recognised. A determination regarding the
standing of Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc) was therefore unnecessary.

The applicants sought judicial review of the decision of the EPA to provide the
Assessment Report to the Minister and therein recommend the approval of the
proposal subject to specified conditions. They also sought judicial review of the
Minister’s subsequent conditional approval.

Martin CJ comprehensively reviewed the EPA Act in particular identifying the
independence of the EPA from the Minister.20 The Chief Justice also canvassed the
EPA’s functions21 and powers,22 the generation of environmental protection

20
21

Save Beeliar Wetlands [2015] WASC 482 (16 December 2015) [16].
Ibid [18].
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policies,23 the conduct of environmental impact assessments24 and the appeals
process against such assessments.25

It is interesting to note that the Chief Justice identified that where the Minister
approves an EPA draft policy, that ‘policy has the force of law as though it had been
enacted as part of the [EPA] Act’.26 Yet he concedes that ‘it is not contended that
any policy formulated in accordance with the provisions of this Part of the Act has
any relevance to the issues in these proceedings’.27

A Grounds for Review
Martin CJ identified ‘five distinct albeit related grounds’28 of review with respect to
the decision of the EPA which arise from three of the four grounds enumerated in the
applicants’ claim. The applicants’ fourth ground challenged the validity of the
Minister’s ultimate approval. The Chief Justice labelled that claim ‘entirely
parasitic’29 in so far as it would succeed in the event that any of the other three
grounds did so. The grounds and Martin CJ’s determinations regarding each are
considered below.

1 Could Offsets Provide Environmental Acceptability?
The applicants claimed that the EPA was required to:

22

Ibid [19].
Ibid [20]-[24].
24
Ibid [25]-[31].
25
Ibid [32]-[33].
26
Ibid [24].
27
Ibid [20].
28
Ibid [106].
29
Ibid [105].
23
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address, separately and discretely, the question of whether the Proposal is environmentally
unacceptable irrespective of any conditions which might be attached to the implementation
before addressing the question of the adequacy of any environmental offsets30

Martin CJ held that such separate consideration was not a requirement of the EPA
Act, and more importantly that the power to recommend a proposal that actually
required environmental offsets was expressly conferred in s 44. There were no
provisions in the EPA Act that supported this ground of review and it was therefore
disallowed.

2 Failure to Take Account of a Mandatory Relevant Consideration

The applicants claimed that the EPA was jurisdictionally bound to take account of its
own publically proclaimed policies in the environmental assessment process. In
particular, the policy that had been published in Position Statement No 9, Guidance
Statement No 19 and Environmental Protection Bulletin No 1 was not considered.
Martin CJ identified this ground as potentially raising three separate important legal
questions with respect to the exercise of statutory power. Firstly, would the decisionmaker actually exceed jurisdiction by considering the policy? Secondly, was the
decision-maker jurisdictionally bound to consider the policy? Thirdly, was the
decision-maker not only required to consider the policy but also to apply it without
deviation?
Martin CJ quoted Mason J in Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd,31
who held that ‘[w]hat factors a decision-maker is bound to consider in making the

30
31

Ibid [109].
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, 39–40 (‘Peko-Wallsend’).
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decision is determined by construction of the statute conferring the discretion.’32 The
Chief Justice then noted that the EPA Act did not expressly require that such policies
be considered in exercising the powers conferred upon the EPA.33
Martin CJ reviewed seven Federal Court cases34 and two Western Australian cases35
and distilled from them that:
a policy formulated by an administrative decision-maker is a mandatory relevant
consideration in the sense that the decision-maker is required to take that policy into account
as a condition of the valid exercise of his or her jurisdiction.36

The Chief Justice did, however, concede that there had been no precedent discovered
at ‘an intermediate Court of Appeal or higher which supports that general
proposition.’37

Martin CJ then applied what he termed ‘the more orthodox approach enunciated by
Mason J in Peko-Wallsend38 to determine whether the proposition could be ‘derived
by implication from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the [EPA] Act.’39
Following a comprehensive review of the relevant sections of the EPA Act, in
particular Part IV which deals with the conduct of an environmental assessment per
se, the Chief Justice concluded that such was in fact the case and that the issue then

32

Save Beeliar Wetlands [2015] WASC 482 (16 December 2015) [128].
Ibid [129].
34
Drake v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (No 1) (1979) 24 ALR 577; Drake v Minister for
Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 (1 January 1979); Gerah Imports Pty Ltd v
Minister for Industry, Technology and Commerce (1987) 17 FCR 1; Nikac v Minister for Immigration
and Ethnic Affairs (1988) 20 FCR 65; BHP Direct Reduced Iron Pty Ltd v CEO, Australian Customs
Service (1998) 55 ALD 665 (23 October 1998); Minister for Immigration, Local Government and
Ethnic Affairs v Gray (1994) 50 FCR 189; Minister for Foreign Affairs v Lee (2014) 227 FCR 279.
35
Clive Elliott Jennings & Co Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2002] WASCA
276 (10 October 2002); Tah Land Pty Ltd v Western Australian Planning Commission [2009] WASC
196 (17 July 2009).
36
Save Beeliar Wetlands [2015] WASC 482 (16 December 2015) [150] (citations omitted).
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid [151].
39
Ibid.
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167

(2016) 18 UNDALR

became one of fact. Had the EPA taken its own published policies into
consideration?

It is interesting to note that in determining this ground Martin CJ identified that the
EPA’s consideration of its own policies in administrative decision-making was a
matter of procedural fairness. He stated that ‘the requirements of procedural fairness
are unlikely to be met’ in the event that the EPA was not required to do so.40

The respondents had conceded that the evidence was uncontroversial and that the
EPA had ‘failed to take account of the policy enunciated in the three published
policy statements upon which the applicant relies.’41

Martin CJ found, therefore, that this ground of review was proven and that the EPA
assessment report was invalid. As a consequence the Minister’s decision was also
invalid. The Chief Justice directed the EPA to determine what was needed to rectify
their process and provide an assessment report that was compliant with the EPA Act.

3 Inadequate Reasons for the EPA’s Acceptance of Offsets
Martin CJ stated that this ground was submitted only as an alternative to the previous
ground. He found that the problem with the assessment report was not that the
reasons provided in it were inadequate, but that the process of assessment was
inadequate. Given, however, that the previous ground was upheld there was no
requirement to adjudicate on the statutory need for the EPA to provide its reasons.

40
41

Ibid [186].
Ibid [189].
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4 Environmental Factors Considered in Isolation?
The applicants submitted that the EPA had assessed the impact of the key
environmental factors individually and not cumulatively. The proposition was that
the EPA Act42 directed the EPA to evaluate a proposal ‘in its entirety.’43 This
interpretation was not controversial.44 However, Martin CJ dismissed this ground on
the basis that the content of the assessment report included paragraphs wherein: (i)
all residual impacts; and (ii) all of the proposed offsets; were collated. He found that
the claim was therefore rebutted by the very structure of the assessment report.45

5 The EPA Proposed that the Minister Empower the CEO to Permit
Construction
The applicants claimed that the inclusion of the clause empowering the CEO of the
EPA to permit the commencement of construction was a ‘constructive failure to
exercise the jurisdiction conferred upon the EPA by Part IV of the [EPA] Act.’46
Martin CJ dismissed this ground on the basis that the recommendation did not alter
the conditional requirements imposed upon the proponents of the proposal and did
not empower the CEO to alter those requirements.

B The Judgment
Martin CJ dismissed four of the five grounds that he had enunciated, and upheld only
the ground that the EPA had failed to take into account a mandatory relevant

42

EPA Act s 44.
Save Beeliar Wetlands [2015] WASC 482 (16 December 2015) [216].
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid [222].
46
Ibid [225].
43
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consideration. This invalidated the assessment report recommendations and therefore
the Minister’s decision which was predicated on that recommendation.

The decision had significant ramifications for both existing approved projects as well
as future proposals, and of particular concern were those projects that proposed to
utilise offsets to gain approval.47 There was general recognition that the decision
‘reinforced the critical need for decision-makers to understand their legislative
obligations.’48

A clear implication for government departments and statutory bodies was that their
policies might be considered mandatory relative considerations in any future
proposal assessment. This necessitated both sides (proponents and decision-makers)
to carefully consider such policies and their consequences for the project under
review.49
III THE APPEAL: JACOB V SAVE BEELIAR WETLANDS (INC)
The State Government, not surprisingly, appealed the judgment on the ground that
Martin CJ had erred in law when he determined that the EPA Policies were a
mandatory relevant consideration.50

47

Sally Audeyev, Lee McIntosh and Sarah De Ceglie, Ignore EPA policies at your peril (9 March
2016) King & Wood Mallesons, 3 <http://www.kwm.com/en/au/knowledge/insights/epa-policies-wasupreme- court-roe-8-highway-project-20160308.>
48
Andre Maynard, ‘Environmental policies: summary of Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc) v Jacob [2015]
WASC
482’
(2016)
3(1)
Australian
Environmental
Law
Digest
5,
6
<http://search.informit.com.au.ipacez.nd.edu.au/documentSummary;dn=999644404981242;res=IELH
SS>.
49
Audeyev, McIntosh and De Ceglie, above n 47, 2.
50
Jacob (2016) 216 LGERA 201.
170

CASE NOTE: JACOB V SAVE BEELIAR WETLANDS (INC)

The respondent, Save Beeliar Wetlands (Inc), argued to have Martin CJ’s decision
upheld on three grounds, two of which had not been raised in the primary case.
Somewhat unexpectedly, the Government elected not to object to the inclusion of the
new claims.The Court’s findings on the respondent’s three grounds of appeal shall be
considered prior to the discussion of the final appeal judgment.

A The Respondent’s Grounds
The respondent argued that there were three additional grounds upon which to
uphold Martin CJ’s judgment that the EPA Assessment Report was invalid.

1 2002 Administrative Procedures
The respondent claimed that the Environmental Impact Assessment (Part IV Division
1) Administrative Procedures 2002 (WA) (the Administrative Procedures) required
that the EPA must consider its published policies when conducting environmental
assessments. This requirement was said to arise pursuant to Clause 9.4.1(j) wherein it
is stated that:
The EPA may consider information from one or more of the following sources in assessing
the proposal –
…
(j) relevant environmental policies, standards and criteria;51

The Court found, based upon the principles of statutory interpretation, that the
policies were a ‘permissive relevant consideration.’52 The clearly expressed intention
that the EPA may, not must, consider relevant environmental policies precludes such
a requirement being a mandatory relevant consideration.

51

Environmental Impact Assessment (Part IV Division 1) Administrative Procedures 2002 (WA) s
9(4)(1); quoted in Jacob (2016) 216 LGERA 201, 210 [43].
52
Jacob (2016) 216 LGERA 201, 213 [62].
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2 Legal Unreasonableness
The respondents claimed that the EPA’s decision-making process was legally
unreasonable, and constituted jurisdictional error.53 They citied both Minister for
Immigration and Citizenship v Li54 (Li) and Minister for Immigration and Border
Protection v Eden.55

The Court cited Li and stated that ‘legal reasonableness provides the boundaries of
the area within which the decision-maker has a genuinely free discretion (citations
omitted)’56 and that such boundaries were to be ascertained by reference to ‘the
scope, subject matter and purpose of the statutory discretionary power (citations
omitted).’57

The Court interpreted the respondent’s claim to mean that ‘“without a reason” [the
EPA] did not have regard to its Policies.’58 However the Court, having already
determined that such consideration was permissive, found that ‘[t]here can be no
obligation to give an explanation about why it did not take into account something it
was not obliged to.’59

The respondent had further argued that the Policies contained two presumptions
against the approval of proposals where there would be ‘a significant residual impact

53

Ibid 213-4 [64].
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332.
55
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden (2016) 240 FCR 158.
56
Jacob (2016) 216 LGERA 201, 214 [68].
57
Ibid.
58
Jacob (2016) 216 LGERA 201, 215 [70].
59
Ibid.
54
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on critical assets (citations omitted)’ and where such impacts were ‘being
counterbalanced by offsets (citations omitted).’60

The Court found that whether or not the EPA adhered to its Policies, it had followed
a ‘staged process’61 to reach its conclusion and recommend approval of the proposal.
This it had done in accordance with the Administrative Procedures, including
approval of the proponent’s Environmental Scoping Document and the Public
Environmental Review. The Court held that the unreasonableness claim had not been
established and was therefore dismissed.

3 Failure to Ask the Required Question
The respondents claimed that the question that the EPA should have asked was
whether the proposal ‘ought not to be implemented at all.’62 They asserted that this
question arose due to the critical nature of the environmental assets in question and
that it should be resolved prior to any consideration of the use of offsets.

The primary judge had dismissed this claim on the basis of statutory construction. He
found that the existence of the power to conditionally approve a proposal with
attendant requirements for the utilisation of environmental offsets, necessarily
inferred that there would be:
a class of proposals in respect of which the issue of environmental acceptability is
inextricably tied up with issues with respect to the conditions and procedures which can and
should be attached to implementation of the proposal.63

60

Ibid [73].
Ibid 216-7 [82].
62
Ibid 217 [83].
63
Ibid [84].
61
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The Court also rejected this claim on the basis that this was, in fact, the wrong
question to ask; and that it was based upon an incorrect belief that the Assessment
Report assumed that the project would be implemented. The Court held that the
correct question was ‘whether the significant residual adverse impacts on critical
assets are so significant as to be environmentally unacceptable’.64 It found that this
question had been answered and that the concern regarding the purported
presumption in the Assessment Report was unfounded when the entire approval
process was considered.
C The Judgment
The Court reviewed in detail the reasoning of Martin CJ that the EPA was required
to consider its own published policies in order for it to exercise its jurisdiction
validly in recommending approval of a proposal to the Minister. It held that the
‘express provisions of the EPA Act leave no room for an implication that the
Policies, or any of them, are mandatory relevant considerations’65 in that process.
First and foremost the EPA Act expressly defines Approved Policies as relevant
considerations in Part III. Such policies are developed through a lengthy and
complex process and are finally approved by the Minister. The policies in question in
this case were not policies promulgated through that process but by the EPA itself.
The Court held that it was ‘inconceivable that the legislature intended the EPA to
have the power to make its own policies on the same matters’66 and to be required to
take them into consideration when assessing a proposal under s 44 of the EPA Act.
Secondly, the EPA is established as an independent expert body which has the role
of conducting environmental assessments of proposals as defined in the EPA Act and
64

Ibid 218 [88].
Ibid 212 [54].
66
Ibid 212 [56].
65
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s 44 in particular. This necessarily implies that the EPA is conducting ‘an evaluative
and advisory function, not exercising a discretionary power.’67

Thirdly, the EPA is largely unfettered in determining the parameters and procedures
for any environmental review subject to compliance with the EPA Act and any
relevant Ministerial direction given in accordance with s 43. Other matters which are
contra indicators to a requirement that the EPA’s own policies are mandatory
relevant considerations include the ‘inevitable delays, costs, prejudice and
inconvenience’68 that would arise. There is also the fact that the EPA Act specifies
the matters that must be considered as mandatory relevant considerations, among
which its policies are not listed.

Ultimately the Court held that the policies were permissive relevant considerations
and not mandatory relevant considerations.

IV CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia in
Jacob has confirmed that the EPA is not mandatorily required to consider certain of
its published policies when making environmental assessment decisions under the
EPA Act.69 This judgment applies specifically to the EPA and the administrative
procedures that it effects in conducting its assessments.

67

Ibid 213 [59].
Ibid [57].
69
Marshall McKenna, Guy Greer and Claudia Henfry, The Roe 8 Saga: The Government Succeeds on
Appeal (18 July 2016) Gilbert + Tobin Lawyers <https://www.gtlaw.com.au/?q=roe-8-sagagovernment-succeeds-appeal>.
68
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The decision does not abrogate the need for the EPA to act in accordance with
policies approved under the EPA Act.70 Similarly, other government department or
statutory body decision-makers must be aware of and act in accordance with any
respective legislated policies.

One positive outcome of this dispute has been that the Government has conducted a
comprehensive review of the way the EPA carries out its functions.71 This review72 is
likely to have been replicated in other government departments and statutory bodies
in order to preclude a repeat of the lengthy challenge that the Roe 8 project became.
It should be noted that the respondents were refused special leave to appeal to the
High Court because the Court concluded that there were ‘insufficient prospects’ of
success.73
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